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Abstract 
The prohibition of torture in international law is dangerously threatened by the need for national security in 
times of the "war on terror". 
The US government attempted to circumvent the prohibition of torture by a narrow interpretation of 
the torture definition in the Bybee Memorandum. The new interpretation of the term "severe" of Article 1 
CAT led to the fact that torturous acts could only be subsumed under "the ' lesser' act of what is commonly 
known as other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, which is also prohibited but not 
criminalized as extensively as torture" 1• This narrow interpretation was the main reason for the horrendous 
incidents at Abu Ghraib and Guantanarno Bay. To prevent future attempts to circumvent the torture prohibi-
tion by using a narrow interpretation the European Court of Human Rjghts has to provide clear criteria to 
differentiate torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment. 
All other approaches to justify torture, which were made with reference to national security, have to 
be rejected as well. Under existing international law an exception to the torture prohibition would not only 
conflict with the content of numerous treaties but also with customary international law and )us cogens, of 
which the torture prohibition is a part. Also a rethinking of the absolute validity of the torture prohibition in 
times of the "war on terror" cannot lead to a recommendation of exceptions to the torture prohibition . 
Whereas the approval to use torture for preventive reasons, such as to obtain information about future terror-
ist attacks, is ineligible from the outset, it turns out that torture to hold off imminent danger as an exception 
to the torture prohibition seems not so far off anyrnore. However, also this approach has to be rejected be-
cause of concerns as to possible "slippery slope"-effects. 
Statement on word length 
The text of this paper ( excluding abstract, table of contents, footnotes and bibliogra-
phy) comprises approximately 15,708 words. 
Torture prohibition, or 
Exceptions to the torture prohibition, or 
Justification of torture. 
Christian M. De Vos "Mind the Gap: Purpose, Pain, and the Difference between Torture and Inhuman 
Treatment" (2007) 14 Hurn. Rts . Br. 4, 4. 
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I INTRODUCTION 
In many areas of the world torture is a cruel reality. Human rights organisations, such as 
amnesty international, have increased public awareness and have denounced torture. In 
the western world, where torture was once regarded as abolished, it seems to be no 
longer taboo as concussive and repulsive pictures of tortured and debased convicts in 
camps at Guantanarno Bay and Abu Ghraib demonstrate. After the attacks on the World 
Trade Centre and the Pentagon on 11 September 2001 the fear of further terrorist attacks 
grew and a growing number of people questioned the torture prohibition. 
This fear triggered a narrow interpretation of the torture definition by the U.S. 
Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) in the Bybee Memorandum2• The narrow interpretation 
of the term "severe" in Article 1 of the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, In-
human and Degrading Treatment or Punishment3 (CAT) led to the fact that torturous 
acts could only be subsumed under "the 'lesser' act of what is commonly known as 
other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, which is also prohibited 
but not criminalized as extensively as torture"4. This led then to "increased flexibility in 
the interrogation techniques applied to terrorism suspects"5 and enabled the U.S. mili-
tary to use cruel interrogation techniques to obtain useful information for the intelli-
gence service. Thus, this flexibility, obtained by an attempt to circumvent the torture 
prohibition, was the main reason for the horrendous incidents at Abu Ghraib and Guan-
tanamo Bay. In addition, calls have been made by scholars, journalists and others to 
allow torture in exceptional cases to make new and extended defence warrants available 
to the state in times of terrorist threats. 6 
2 
Memorandum from U.S. Dept. of Justice, Counsel to the President, Office of the Assistant Attorney 
General, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Re: Standards of Conduct for Interrogation 
Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A (1 August 2002) ["Bybee Memorandum"], available at 
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/documents/cheney/torture memo aug2002.pdf (last ac-
cessed: 09 May 2008). 
3 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (10 
December 1984) 1465 UNTS 85 , art I . [CAT] 
4 De Vos, above n I, 4. 
5 Miri Lim " Redefining Torture in the Age of Terrorism: An Argument Against the Dilution of Human 
Rights" (2006) 13 Wash. & Lee J. Civil Rts . & Soc. Just. 83, 84. 
6 For example: Miriam Gur-Arye "Can the War against Terror Justify the Use of Force in Interroga-
tions? Reflection in Light of the Israeli Experience" in Sanford Levinson (ed) Torture: A Collection 
(Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004) I 83 ; Alan Dershowitz "Tortured Reasoning" in Sanford Lev-
inson ( ed) Torture - A Collection (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004) 257. 
Because of this alarming development this paper analyses both the attempt to 
circumvent the torture prohibition by a narrow interpretation of the term "torture" and a 
few approaches about justification of torture in exceptional cases. 
Therefore, the paper deals in its first part with the torture definition of Article 1 
CA T7 and attempts to clarify the question "What kind of treatment constitutes torture 
under international law?". It scrutinizes how to distinguish torture and other cruel, in-
human, or degrading treatment or punishment. Further it asks for the reasons which 
made it possible for the OLC to reinterpret the CA T's torture definition in such a nar-
row way. Consequently, the paper comes forward with a proposal as to how to avoid a 
future attempt to circumvent the prohibition of torture in international law. 
In its second part, the paper explains the scope of validity of the torture prohibi-
tion in international law and discusses then whether there is a possibility under the ex-
isting law to make in particular situations, an exception to the torture prohibition or 
whether there should be the possibility to make exceptions in times of the "war on ter-
ror". It deals with torture used to prevent future threat for national security, such as the 
use of torture to obtain information about future terrorist attacks, and with torture to 
fend off an actual threat, such as the use of torture in a "ticking bomb scenario". The 
question about the possibility of making exceptions to the torture prohibition is dis-
cussed from both legal and ethical viewpoints. In this context the paper includes con-
cerns as to misuse of those requested exceptions and possible "slippery slope"-effects. 
II AMERICA'S "WAR ON TERROR" - THE RECURRENCE OF TOR-
TURE IN CONSTITUTIONAL STATES 
After the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 the attitude towards torture changed 
within constitutional states and simultaneously the attitude towards the prohibition of 
torture in international law. 8 Al-Qaeda's attacks committed by hijacked aircrafts on the 
World Trade Centre and the Pentagon are among the most atrocious terrorist attacks in 
history. About 3000 people were killed9 and one of the most important symbols of 
world trade was destroyed. These attacks were qualified by the United Nation Security 
Council as a threat to the world peace and to international security. Thus, the right to 
7 CAT, above n 3, art l . 
8 See Richard A. Posner "Torture, Terrorism, and Interrogation" in Sanford Levinson (ed) Torture: A 
Collection (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004) 291 , 291. 
9 "September 11 , 2001 Victims", available at: www.septemberl1victims.com/septemberl 1 victims 
/victims list.htm (last accessed 10 May 2008). 
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individual and collective "self-defence" in accordance with the UN-Charter was trig-
gered. 10 
On the basis of three resolutions in autumn and winter 2001 the USA waged a 
war against Afghanistan. Already at this time the US government spoke about the "war 
on terror". This war led within a short period of time to the overthrow of the Taliban, 
who supported Al-Qaeda's network of terror. However, this war authorized by the UN 
Security Council ended at the latest on the 5 December 2001 with the appointment of 
the government and President Karzai based on the Petersberger peace agreement 11 • 
Meantime the USA has started to fight an international "war on terror". The 
government uses the term "war on terror" deliberately to make clear that they still are in 
a global armed conflict with Al-Qaeda. Since that time the prohibition of torture in in-
ternational law is dangerously threatened under reference to the need for national secu-
rity. The "war on terror" is based on a policy which tries to legalise far-ranging excep-
tions to essential principles of constitutional states, of democracy and of human rights. 12 
"For the U.S. government, the fear of terrorist attacks has triggered a narrow interpreta-
tion of the definition of torture" in the OLC's Bybee Memorandum and this "led to in-
creased flexibility in the interrogation techniques applied to terrorism suspects." 13 Due 
to the fact that the Bybee Memorandum requires an extremely high threshold for an act 
of torture as it demands extremely severe ill-treatment that leads to serious physical 
injuries or long-lasting mental harm, 14 thus torturous acts could no longer be subsumed 
under the term of torture, but only under "the 'lesser' act of what is commonly known 
as other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment. This is also prohibited 
but not criminalized as extensively as torture" 15 • This redefinition of torture in the Bybee 
Memorandum contributed to human rights abuses by acts of torture in Guantanamo 
Bay, Abu Ghraib, "and facilitated the rendering of detainees to other jurisdictions that 
interrogate abusively" 16• 
10 UNSC Resolution (12 September 2001) S/RES/ 1368/2001, UNSC Resolution (28 September 2001) 
S/RES/1373 /2001, UNSC Resolution (14 November 2001) S/RES/1378/2001 available at: 
www.un.org/Docs/scres/200 l /sc200 l .htm (last accessed: 09 May 2008). 
11 See "Rebuilding Afghanistan - Peace and Stability" (2 December 2002), available at: www.unama-
afg.org/ nonUN%20Docs/ lnternation-Conferences&Forums/BonnTalks/ final%20communigue%202 
%20dec%2002.pdf (last accessed 09 May 2008). 
12 Manfred Nowak "Das System Guantanamo" (2006) 36 APuZ 23, 23. 
13 Lim, above n 5, 84. 
14 Bybee Memorandum, above n 2, 6, 7. 
15 De Vos, above n I, 4. 
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In January 2002 US-militaries started to transfer captives of the "war on terror" 
to the detention centre at Guantanamo Bay. There they were indefinitely arrested 
without hearing and without indictment to extract interesting information about future 
attacks by using brutal interrogation techniques. The U.S. government created a symbol 
standing for a complex system of combating terrorism, which systematically violated 
human rights. 17 
In principle, they impose on every captive, who was under suspicion to be a ter-
rorist or who has in someway links to Al-Qaeda, the so called "unlawful combatant 
status". A lawful combatant has a prisoner of war status under Article 4 of the Geneva 
Convention 18• To become a lawful combatant it is necessary to follow the international 
rules of armed conflicts. A lawful combatant is " immune from prosecution for lawful 
combat activities".19 Combatants who are "not legally authorized to engage in armed 
conflict but do so without authority" are unlawful combatants.2° For the latter the Ge-
neva Convention does not apply. As previously said, by interpreting the torture defini-
tion of Article 1 CAT2 1 extreme narrowly in the Bybee Memorandum a lot of torturous 
acts could only be characterized as other cruel , inhuman or degrading treatment or pun-
ishment which is also prohibited but not criminalized as extensively as torture. Thus, by 
this attempt to circumvent the prohibition of torture the U.S. violated regulations about 
the treatment of prisoners and the prohibition of torture in international law. Methods 
used were among other "beatings, exposure to loud and persistent noise and music, hu-
miliating acts, solitary confinement, temperature extremes, and [ detainees were] forced 
into bodily positions"22 • 
A further technique, which also belongs to the measures to fight against terror-
ism, is the so called extraordinary renditions. An extraordinary rendition is "a system 
of sending captives to other countries with less progressive human rights standards in 
order to interrogate them more aggressively", which often results in torture. 23 The CIA 
16 Lim, above n 5, 110. 
17 Dawid Danilo Bartelt and Ferdinand Muggenthaler "Das Rendition-Programm der USA und die Rolle 
Europas" (2006) 36 APuZ 3 I , 31 . 
18 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (12 August 1949) 75 UNTS 135, 
art 4. 
19 Lim, above n 5, 87 ; see al so Joseph P. Bialke "Al-Qaeda & Taliban Unlawful Combatant Detainees, 
Unlawful Belligerency, and the International Laws of Armed Conflict" (2004) 55 A.F. L. Rev. 1, 9. 
20 Lim, above n 5, 87. 
2 1 CAT, above n 3, art I . 
22 Lim, above n 5, 86, 87. 
23 Andrew A. Moher "The Lesser of Two Evils?: An Argument for Judicially Sanctioned Torture in a 
Post-9/ 11 World" (2004) 26 T. Jefferson L. Rev. 469, 479, 480 . 
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uses this method to bring captives, which were caught abroad, to third countries, where 
they are detained without public proceedings.24 However, renditions are not an idea of 
"the war on terror", but they have assumed alarming dimensions. While in the 1990' s 
renditions were used to pick up criminals abroad, such as drug kingpins, and then bring-
ing them to the courts, in times of "war on terror" it is used to "make certain detainees 
neither go to court nor go back to the streets" .25 For the CIA, an advantage is that the 
facilities , where the interrogations take place, are not accessible to outsider.26 Thus, the 
CIA is able to conduct psychologically and physically aggressive methods during their 
interrogations free from the scrutiny of the public. 
An example of such a rendition is the case of Arar. On 26 September 2002 the 
Canadian Maher Arar was caught at JFK Airport and brought at first to a US prison 
where he was held in custody for thirteen days and interrogated about alleged links with 
Al-Qaeda.27 Then he was brought to Syria without the possibility to contact his family, 
lawyer or the Canadian consulate. In Syria he was brought to the Palestine branch of 
Syrian military intelligence, who are renowned for torturing political prisoners. 28 During 
the six days of interrogation he was severely beaten und threatened with electric shocks 
and the "metal chair". 29 The latter is a "torture device that stretches the spine". 30 Ulti-
mately, under this pressure Arar falsely told his interrogators that he had a link to Al-
Qaeda and then he was put into a small cell for more than ten months. "He had no expo-
sure to natural lights at all for the first six month".31 After the U.S. found out that he was 
not linked with Al-Qaeda they returned him to Canada. 32 
Approximately hundreds of people were transported in alleged private aircrafts 
over the frontiers since 2001 by this means.33 The aim is to subject them to torturous 
interrogation techniques and to deprive them also of rights which are guaranteed under 
the rule of law and which are also requested by international law.34 It is difficult to hold 
countries which employ torturing interrogators in other countries, to account. They "can 
24 Lim, above n 5, 91 . 
25 Ibid, 91 , 92 . 
26 See Dana Priest and Barton Gellman "U.S. Decries Abuse but Defends Interrogations: ' Stress and 
Duress ' Tactics Used on Terrorism Suspects Held in Secret Overseas Facilities" (26 December 2002) 
Washington Post, Washington AO!. 
27 
Amnesty International "USA: Deporting for Torture?" (14 November 2003) Press Release; available 
at: http ://web.amnesty. org/1ibrary/index/engamr5 l 1392003 (last accessed: 09 May 2008). 
28 Ibid . 
29 Ibid . 
30 Lim, above n 5, 92 . 
31 Amnesty International , above n 27. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Bartelt and Muggenthaler, above n 17, 31 . 
34 See Moher, above n 23 , 480, 481 . 
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gam valuable information with impunity, while claiming that they have 'no direct 
knowledge' of the host country's interrogation methods"35 • 
In April 2004 concussive and repulsive pictures of tortured and debased convicts 
at Abu Ghraib were presented to the public. These pictures showed an appalled audi-
ence quite plainly what human rights organisations were aware of for a long time: Tor-
ture is recurred in constitutional states.36 Marcy Strauss summarised only a few of the 
actual cruelties: 37 
"The abuse included acts of sexual degradation such as forcing detainees to strip naked 
or to engage in acts of simulated fellatio. Other detainees were forced to masturbate in 
front of female soldiers, or threatened with rape. One soldier allegedly sexually as-
saulted a detainee with a chemical light stick or broom. Humiliation tactics were ram-
pant. For example, two Army dog handlers used unmuzzled dogs to frighten Iraqi teen-
agers in order to force the youths to urinate or defecate on themselves. [ ... ] Physical 
abuse also allegedly occurred, including: breaking chemical lights and pouring the 
phosphoric liquid on detainees, pouring cold water on naked detainees, and beating de-
tainees with a broom handle and a chair. Head blows, significant enough to render de-
tainees unconscious, also occurred." 
Both examinations in connection with the incidents at Abu Ghraib and media reports 
found out that after January 2002 members of the government and high-ranking military 
had motivated their inferiors several to circumvent the prohibition of torture.38 Indeed, 
the memoranda which allowed the ill-treatment were retracted officially. However, the 
hitherto examination of the incidents at Abu Ghraib and further examinations because of 
other incidents outside of Abu Ghraib showed that the US government is neither inter-
ested in a clarification of the facts nor in a penalisation of the responsible persons. 39 Un-
til now only the executing soldiers oflower ranking were brought to trial. 40 
Meanwhile, the absolute validity of the torture prohibition was also put into 
question in the German constitutional state. The discussion about the behaviour of the 
former police vice president, Wolfgang Daschner, showed that turning away from the 
35 Ibid , 480 . 
36 Bartelt and Muggenthaler, above n 17, 32 . 
37 Marcy Strauss "The Lessons of Abu Ghraib" (2005) 66 Ohio St. L.J . 1269, 1273, 1274. 
38 Bartelt and Muggenthaler, above n 17, 33. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Strauss, above n 37, 1275. 
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absolute prohibition of torture found favour with scholars41 and also with the public. 
Where a boy was assumed to be still alive in a kidnap situation, in 2002, Daschner al-
lowed the threat of serious violence against the kidnapper to find out the location of the 
boy. Politicians of different parties and high ranking representatives of the justice were 
appreciative of Daschner 's behaviour after the incident appeared before the public. 
Even more approval was found in numerous letters to the newspapers where often ex-
plicit admiration for Daschner 's attitude was expressed. The criminal proceeding 
against Daschner ended in December 2004 with a mild judgement of the regional court 
Frankfurt42 - with just a warning. Admittedly, the court pointed at the absolute prohibi-
tion of torture. 
However, after the judgement of the regional court Frankfurt, the Daschner-
Case was far from settled - it emerged "as the most controversial case in criminal law in 
the German post-war history"43 • It was Daschner himself, who requested that torture has 
to be allowed by law in exceptional cases. And nearly all, who agreed with him, primar-
ily referred to the "ticking bomb scenario", and hence referred to terrorism.44 The tick-
ing bomb scenario describes a hypothetically extreme situation: An (atomic) bomb hid-
den by terrorists threatens to kill numerous people. The police catch one of the terror-
ists, who possesses all the necessary information to avert the catastrophe. Other possi-
bilities to avert danger, such as the fulfilment of a condition, are non existent. 45 Particu-
larly with regard to such a situation some scholars propose, if not even request, to exert 
torture by the state to squeeze out the lifesaving information from the (presumed) terror-
ist. 46 
Admittedly the requests for exceptions to the torture prohibition are not re-
stricted to this hypothetical extreme situation. It is further argued that the state needs in 
general extended defence warrants to equip it for its fight against terrorism. 
41 E.g. Volker Erb "Nothilfe durch Folter" [2005] Jura 24; Reinhard Merkel "Folter und Notwehr" in 
Michael Pawlik and Rainer Zaczyk (ed) Festschriftfiir GiintherJakobs (Carl Heymanns Verlag, Mu-
nich, 2007) 375. 
42 LG Frankfurt/M [2005) NJW 692 ("Daschner"). 
43 Claus Roxin "Rettungsfolter?" in Rainer Griesbaum et al. (ed) Festschrift fiir Kay Nehm (Berliner 
Wissenschaftsverlag, Berlin, 2006) 205 , 205 . 
44 Bartelt and Muggenthaler, above n 17, 32 . 
45 See similar cases : Anne O ' Rourke et al "Torture, Slippery Slopes, Intellectual Apologists, and Tick-
ing Bombs: An Australian Response to Bagaric and Clarke" (2005) 40 U.S.F.L. Rev. 85, JOI; David 
Luban "Liberalism, Torture and the Ticking Bomb" (2005) 91 Va. L. Rev. 1425, 1440. 
46 For example: Dershowitz, above n 6,257. 
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ill WHAT KIND OF TREATMENT CONSTITUTES TORTURE? - THE 
CAT'S DEFINITION OF TORTURE AND ITS NARROW INTERPRE-
TATION IN THE BYBEE MEMORANDUM 
The first question to be explored is "What kind of treatment constitutes torture under 
international law?" It is important to distinguish torture from other cruel, inhuman, or 
degrading treatment or punishment. The narrow interpretation of the torture definition 
in the Bybee Memorandum led to the horrendous incidents at Abu Ghraib and Guan-
tanamo Bay, and therefore the reasons which led to this narrow interpretation need to be 
clarified. In a last step a proposal to avoid a future attempt to circumvent the prohibition 
of torture is outlined. 
A The Definition of Torture in the CAT 
To determine what kind of treatment constitutes torture under international law one can 
consult the definition of torture in Article 1 CAT. Article 1(1) CAT states:47 
"For the purposes of this Convention, the term 'torture ' means any act by which severe 
pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for 
such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, pun-
ishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having com-
mitted, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on dis-
crimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation 
of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an 
official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or 
incidental to lawful sanctions." 
The definition of Article 1 CAT "is widely accepted as the international definition of 
torture".48 Five elements in the wording outline what qualifies a treatment as torture: (a) 
an act, (b) intent, (c) a purpose, (d) involvement of a public official and (e) severe 
physical or mental pain or suffering. 
While the terms (a) to (d) are nearly indisputable, the interpretation of the term 
( e) "severe physical or mental pain or suffering" seems to be exceedingly difficult. 
47 CAT, above n 3, art. 1 (I) . 
48 Rebecca B. Schechter "Intentional Starvation as Torture: Exploring the Gray Area between Ill-
Treatment and Torture" (2003) 18 Am. U. Int' I L. Rev. 1233, 1248. 
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I Act 
The definition demands an act that causes severe physical or mental pain or suffering. 
Here it is questionable if "act" means an act in a broader sense so that also omissions, 
such as the failure to provide a detainee with food and drinks for days, could be in-
cluded. The purpose of the CAT is the prohibition of all governmental conduct that in-
flicts pain or suffering for the purposes stated in Article 1. Omissions can cause as much 
physical or mental pain or suffering as a positive act and thus can achieve the same re-
sults as a positive act. 49 Thus, an omission is also sufficient to constitute an act of tor-
ture. 
2 Intent 
The pain or suffering has to be intentionally inflicted on a person. Thus, the term "inten-
tionally" has the important function of excluding negligent conduct,50 which therefore 
can only be subsumed under Article 16 CA T51 as other cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment. 
3 Purpose 
A certain purpose has to be pursued with the act. Pursuant to the definition in Article 1 
CAT pain or suffering has to be inflicted "for such purposes as obtaining from him or a 
third person information or a confession, [ .... ]"52. On the basis of the purpose torture can 
be distinguished from other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment in Article 16 CA T53 , 
which does not demand a purpose. 
4 Involvement of a public official 
It is questionable as to what extent the state has to be involved in such acts so that one 
can speak about torture. Pursuant to the definition the act has to be "inflicted by or at 
49 Lim, above n 5, 95. 
50 Ahcene Boulesbaa The UN. Convention on Torture and the Prospects for Enforcement (Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague, 1999) 20. 
51 CAT, above n 3, art I. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid, art I 6. 
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the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person 
acting in an official capacity"54 • 
The term "acquiescence" was inserted at the suggestion of the USA to include 
also "omission or failure of a public official to act when he had reasonable grounds to 
believe that torture had been or was being committed"55 • The USA's understanding of 
the term "acquiescence" goes beyond the wording: The public official must have 
awareness of such activity and then breaches his legal duty to prevent it.56 However, 
actual knowledge is not obligatory. Wilful blindness is sufficient. The latter describes 
the situation where the public official has a duty to prevent the conduct, but "deliber-
ately closes his eyes to what would otherwise have been obvious to him"57 • Only such a 
wide interpretation of the term "acquiescence" is helpful to achieve the purpose of the 
convention which is prohibition of all governmental conduct that inflicts pain or suffer-
ing. This includes conduct caused by wilful blindness. 
5 Severe physical or mental pain or suffering 
The wording of Article 1 CAT demands "severe physical or mental pain or suffering". 
The word "severe" suggests that not every mistreatment constitutes torture, and certain 
"severity" of pain or suffering is necessary. 
Because the term "severe" is very amenable for interpretation it is difficult to say 
which level of pain or suffering has to be achieved to qualify a treatment as torture. In 
principle it could be expected that terms, which need to be interpreted, will be inter-
preted by the courts to attain legal certainty. At any rate, this is the rule for undeter-
mined terms in statutes. Intrinsically it seems that until now it was not considered nec-
essary or the court was not capable to determine the threshold of severity which quali-
fies a treatment as torture. "In those few cases dealing with the definition of torture, 
most courts have avoided providing an overall definition, preferring to single out certain 
prohibited practices as torture [ ... ]"58 • For example, in Ireland v United Kingdom the 
European Court of Human Rights considered the British "five techniques" (hooding, 
wall-standing for hours, sleep depravation, loud noise and restricted food and water) for 
inhuman treatment but not as torture because of the "intensity of suffering"59 • Until now 
54 Ibid, art I. 
55 Boulesbaa, above n 50, 26. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Ibid, 26, 27. 
58 Strauss, above n 3 7, 1307. 
59 Ireland v United Kingdom [ I 978] ECHR 53 I 0/71 para I 67. 
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the court has not had the ability to take a firm stand where the threshold of severity has 
to be fixed abstractly and in general. The only thing which is safe to say is that a certain 
severity has to be existent, which was, up to now, determined on the basis of the cir-
cumstances of each individual case. 
Because the wording of Article 16 CAT does not expressly demand severe pain 
or suffering, torture should be also distinguishable from cruel, inhuman, or degrading 
treatment by means of the severity. 
B Differentiation between Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment 
Article 16 CAT speaks about "other acts of cruel , inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment which do not amount to torture as defined Article 1 CAT, when such acts 
are committed by [ ... ] a public official [ ... ]"60 • Article 1 and 16 CAT have in common 
that both demand an act and the involvement of a public official. Unlike Article 1 CAT 
which contains the torture definition, Article 16 CAT does without the terms "intent", 
"purpose" and "severe physical or mental pain or suffering". Thus, it is to be assumed 
that both types of treatments are distinguishable by means of those three criteria. 
A clear differentiation of torture and other inhuman treatment is very important. 
Indeed, both forms of treatment are not allowed. However, Article 16(1) CAT only re-
quires that State Parties "undertake to prevent [ ... and not prohibit] under its jurisdiction 
other acts of cruel , inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment which do not amount 
to torture [ ... ]"61 • As to the prohibition of torture, the CAT requires that State Parties 
provide for torture victims judicial remedies and compensation, prosecute or extradite 
the offenders and that they reject statements as evidence, which were obtained through 
the use of torture in legal proceedings.62 "None of these obligations apply to inhuman 
treatment. "63 It is of high importance for people, who want to contravene the rules of 
international law, that perpetration of "mere" inhuman treatment, which does not consti-
tute torture, is not criminalized as extensively as torture. Thus, such people are up to 
create the impression that the illicitly committed act was not torture but "only" other 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. 
6° CAT, above n 3, art 16( 1). 
6 1 Ibid. 
62 See ibid, art 6-8, 14, 15. 
63 De Vos, above n I , 5. 
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This was also the aim of the USA when the OLC created "legally unsound offi-
cial opinions", such as the Bybee Memorandum. To make sure that their interrogation 
techniques could not be qualified as acts of torture, but "only" as acts of other inhuman 
treatment they interpreted the term "severe" in such a narrow way that only extreme acts 
could still be qualified as torture. By this redefinition they tried to circumvent the prohi-
bition of torture and made it possible during the period of the Bybee Memorandum to 
use very aggressive interrogation techniques when they questioned suspected terrorists 
to obtain informative intelligence. 
I How do the Commission of Human Rights and the European Court of Human 
Rights differentiate between torture and other inhuman treatment? 
Whereas the Commission of Human Rights attaches importance to both severity and 
purpose to differentiate torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment 
(CIDT), the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) attaches importance only to the 
term "severe". 
In the Greek Case the Commission declared that "torture is often used to de-
scribe inhuman treatment, which has a purpose, such as the obtaining of information or 
confession, or the infliction of punishment, and it is generally an aggravated form of 
inhuman treatment"64 • The Commission accepted that the severity of pain or suffering 
could distinguish torture from CIDT, "but it was the purpose of the conduct that was of 
paramount importance in distinguishing between [both]"65 
However, in the case of Ireland v United Kingdom the ECHR did not consider 
the purpose but rather the term "severe" to differentiate torture and CIDT. This case 
dealt with five interrogation techniques (hooding, wall-standing for hours, sleep depra-
vation, loud noise and restricted food and water) used by British Security Force toques-
tion IRA suspects. By considering again the purpose as the criteria to differentiate tor-
ture and CIDT the Commission arrived at the conclusion that '"the systematic applica-
tion of the techniques for the purpose of inducing a person to give information shows a 
clear resemblance to those methods of systematic torture"'66 The ECHR, however, dis-
agreed with the Commission's view and predominantly considered the "severity" as the 
main criteria to differentiate between torture and CIDT: 67 
64 Denmark et al. v Greece (1969) 12 Yearbook of the European Convention on Human Rights 186. 
65 De Vos, above n I, 4. 
66 See ibid, 5. 
67 Jrelandv United Kingdom, above 59, para 167. 
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"Tn the Court's view, this distinction derives principally from a difference in the inten-
sity of the suffering inflicted. [ ... ] Although the five techniques, as applied in combina-
tion, undoubtedly amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment[ ... ] they did not occa-
sion suffering of the particular intensity and cruelty implied by the word torture as so 
understood." 
While working on the draft convention for the later CAT a Working Group was set up 
to find out the difference between torture and CIDT.68 The Working Group arrived at 
the conclusion that "the concept of torture could be defined in reasonable precise terms, 
[but] it was impossible to draft a precise definition of other [inhuman treatment]"69 • 
Aware of the Working Group's difficulties in finding clear criteria for the differentia-
tion, the General Assembly in 1984 adopted the CAT and with it its vague wordings in 
Article l and 16. 
The Commission using purpose as its main criterion for distinction between tor-
ture and CIDT, comes quite often to the conclusion that it is a matter of torture, whereas 
it seems that the ECHR, which considers severity as the main criterion for distinction, is 
very reluctant to qualify an inhuman treatment as torture. In the years between 1978 and 
1996 the "ECHR did not find any acts of torture". 70 Although the ECHR considers the 
term "severe" as its main criterion to differentiate torture and CIDT, it has not even de-
termined case groups nor has it given a clear interpretation of the term "severe". Its de-
cided cases are all single-case decisions. One might think the court decided intuitively 
and tried to avoid providing an overall definition and rather preferred "to single out cer-
tain prohibited practices as torture or inhuman treatment" 71 • 
2 The interpretation of torture in the Bybee Memorandum 
The Bybee Memorandum regards the "severity" of pain or suffering as the "key statu-
tory phrase" in the torture definition. 72 It requires such an extremely high threshold to 
accept an act as torture that an affirmative answer of the existence of torture is seldom if 
68 De Vos, above n I , 5. 
69 J. Herman Burgers and Hans Danelius The United Nations Convention against Torture (Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht, 1988) 149. 
70 Louis-Phillipe F. Rouillard " Misinterpreting the Prohibition of Torture Under International Law: The 
Office of Legal Counsel Memorandum" (2005) 21 Am. U. lnt'I L. Rev, 9, 30. 
71 Strauss, aboven37, 1307. 
72 Bybee Memorandum , see above n 2, I 3. 
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ever possible. "The pain or suffering must be of such a high level of intensity that the 
pain is difficult for the subject to endure."73 The level of pain caused by physical abuse 
must be comparable with the level of pain that "would ordinarily be associated with a 
sufficiently serious physical condition or injury, such as death, organ failure or serious 
impairment of body function [ .. . ]"74. In the case of mental pain or suffering the Bybee 
Memorandum speaks about torture if the act leads to "some lasting, though not neces-
sary permanent, damages [ ... ] which can last month or even years [ ... J".75 
It is obvious that pursuant to this memorandum there is a range of pain that is 
not sufficient to call torture. Thus it is questionable which interrogation techniques qual-
ify as torture under this extremely narrow interpretation. One can find the answer in the 
Bybee Memorandum itself: "In short, reading the definition of torture as a whole, it is 
plain that the term encompasses only extreme acts"76 • Based on this memorandum the 
use of aggressive interrogation techniques was arranged. Even a list of "counterresis-
tance techniques" was made, which includes:77 
" the use of stress positions for up to four hours, interrogations for up to twenty hours, 
solitary detention for up to thirty days, forced grooming, removal of all comfort items 
(including the Koran and toilet paper), hooding, the removal of clothing, forced shaving 
of facial hair, auditory/environmental manipulation, and ' mild non-injurious contact '." 
The redefinition was absolutely absurd and it was by no means comprehended by the 
wording of Article 1 CAT. It is implausible that severe pain by itself is not sufficient to 
reach the level of torture and that, from memorandum' s point of view, it needs pain 
equivalent to organ failure. 78 
Certainly it was not only the vague definition of torture, but also the ECHR' s re-
luctance to qualify an act as torture and also the fact that there was no clear interpreta-
tion of the term "severe" provided by the ECHR and the Commission which led to the 
redefinition of torture in the US ' s favour when in the "war on terror" "the need for in-
formation is so pressing"79• 
73 Manfred Nowak "What Practices Constitute Torture?: US und UN Standards" (2006) 28 Hum. Rts. Q 
809, 812 . 
74 Bybee Memorandum , see above n 2, 6. 
75 [bid 7 
76 See N~wak, above n 73 , 81 2 with additional re ferences. 
77 See De Vos, above n I , 6. 
78 Strauss, above n 3 7, 1307. 
79 Ibid, 1308. 
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3 The Levin Memorandum 
Only after the horrendous pictures of Abu Ghraib were presented to the public was the 
Bybee Memorandum replaced after two years of existence, by the Levin Memoran-
dum80. Although the Levin Memorandum "repudiates some of the more extreme aspects 
of the Bybee Memo's interpretation of torture" 81 , it also contains as the criterion of dis-
tinction between torture and CIDT the "severity" of pain or suffering. 82 Thus, the danger 
of circumvention persists in some respects, until the ECHR has taken a firm stand as to 
the differentiation between torture and CIDT. 
C Proposal to Avoid Attempts of Future Circumvention of the Torture Prohi-
bition 
Instead of criticising only the interpretation of torture in the Bybee Memorandum, one 
should already pass criticism at an earlier stage. The attempt to circumvent the prohibi-
tion of torture by a narrow interpretation of the CA T's torture definition in the Bybee 
Memorandum, was only possible because there is no clear and all-encompassing defini-
tion of torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment. The 
CAT "defines the prohibited conduct somewhat vaguely and the few court cases that 
have addressed this issue tend to avoid any overarching definition"83 . Indeed, the CAT 
requires from its parties to avoid also CIDT which does not amount to torture, but it 
does not explain the difference between torture and CIDT. 84 This has led to difficulties 
in distinguishing between torture and CIDT. 
Therefore one has to think about clear criteria to differentiate between torture 
and CIDT to prevent further circumvention of the torture prohibition by using a narrow 
interpretation. 
At first one could think about whether the definition of torture and CIDT should 
be changed and whether a new definition should feature clearer terms. As previously 
said, the problem is the interpretation of the term "severe" in Article 1 CAT. However, 
80 Memorandum from Daniel Levin, Acting Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Dep't of Justice, to James 
B. Covey, Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Regarding Legal Standards Applicable Under 
18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A (30 December 2004) [Levin Memorandum]; available at 
www.usdoj.gov/olc/18usc23402340a2.htm (last accessed 11 May 2008). 81 De Vos, above n I, 6. 
82 See Levin Memorandum, above n 80. 
83 Strauss,aboven37, 1306. 
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this term cannot be described clearly. It has to be interpreted by the courts. Also an ab-
dication of the term "severe" is not possible because people invariably associate cruel 
torment and very painful treatment with torture. Thus, simple pain and suffering is not 
sufficient. 
Therefore one should preclude a new attempt of circumvention by providing 
clear criteria to differentiate torture and CIDT. To interpret Article 1 and 16 CAT to 
obtain clear criteria is intrinsically the task of the court, particularly of the ECHR. 
1 Differentiation by means of severity 
Nobody would disagree that a treatment can only amount to torture if the act is commit-
ted with intent and to achieve a purpose as listed in Article 1 CAT. However, the word-
ing demands also for a certain severity of pain or suffering caused by the act. Because 
Article 16 CAT speaks only about "other acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment 
or punishment which do not amount to torture as defined in Article 1 [ .. . ]", it is assumed 
that neither intent nor a special purpose is necessary for an act of other cruel, inhuman 
or degrading treatment or punishment. It is also assumed that the level of pain or suffer-
ing, that is its severity, is lower compared with the level required for torture. This as-
sumption based on the fact that the wording of Article 16 CAT speaks about acts of 
other cruel, inhuman, degrading treatment and does not include the words intent, pur-
pose and severe pain or suffering. By contrast, to qualify an inhuman act as torture the 
three criteria " intent, purpose and severe of pain or suffering" have to be fulfilled. That 
is, also if the purpose and intent are fulfilled, pursuant to the view of the Memorandum 
and of the ECHR there is a need for an aggravated form of pain or suffering to qualify 
an inhuman treatment as torture. 
To differentiate torture and CIDT by means of the severity seems to be very dif-
ficult or even impossible because one has to say abstractly and in general at which level 
of pain and suffering an act of CIDT will turn into torture. The problem is that different 
people will consider the severity of pain or suffering caused by a particular act differ-
ently. This was also mentioned by the ECHR in the case of Ireland v United Kingdom 
when it states: 85 
84 Ibid, 1307. 
85 Ireland v United Kingdom, above n 59, para 162. 
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"[Whether the pain or suffering is severe] depends on all circumstances of the case, 
such as the duration of the treatment, its physical and mental effects and, in some cases, 
the sex, age and state of health of the victim etc.". 
Thus, to determine the severity of the pain or suffering it is necessary to consider the 
individual person. An abstract determination of severity is therefore not possible so that 
abstract guidelines or lists of prohibited practices cannot be used for the differentiation. 
To make a list of prohibited conduct would be possible for a few practices which are so 
cruel and painful by their nature that every human being would feel severe pain or suf-
fering, but such a list would be far from an exhaustive list. Moreover, "man's creativity 
knows no bounds"86 so that a list of prohibited practices would not be useful. 
It seems impossible to determine abstractly (without considering all circum-
stances of the particular case) the level of severity which is necessary or sufficient to 
tum an act of CIDT into torture. This becomes also apparent if one looks at the attempt 
of the OLC in the Bybee Memorandum. Irrespective of the fact that the required level of 
pain or suffering is too high and absurd, one will recognize that they tried to find a 
comparable example to determine the severity abstractly. The Bybee Memorandum de-
mands for pain or suffering which "would ordinarily be associated with a sufficiently 
serious physical condition or injury, such as death, organ failure or serious impairment 
of body function [ ... ]"87 • 
Because of the use of comparable examples to determine the severity a lot of 
questions arise: "What pain constitutes such a level [ ... ] What exactly does it feel like to 
suffer from organ failure, and how does the pain differ from otherwise "severe" pain 
short of organ failure?"88 How can an interrogator determine the level of pain which will 
arise during the interrogation? Is the assessment to determine the severity objective or 
subjective? "And how does one begin to make such an assessment? Human studies? 
Questionnaires of victims?"89 Therefore it does not make sense to insert comparable 
examples, as it will not help. 
2 Differentiation by means of purpose 
However, is it really necessary to demand for an act of torture an aggravated form of 
pain or suffering compared to the inhuman treatment of Article 16 CAT, where the 
86 Strauss, aboven37, 1308. 
87 Bybee Memorandum, above n 2, 6. 
88 Strauss, aboven37, 1308. 
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wording does not require "severe" pain or suffering? If not, one does not have to con-
sider the difficult term "severe" any longer. The UN decided not to describe torture as 
an aggravated form of CIDT in the final version of the CAT as it was in Article 1 of the 
1975 Declaration90 which provided the basis for the CAT. Thus, one could think that the 
UN wants to follow the Commissions' approach so that the main criterion to differenti-
ate between torture and CIDT is a purpose listed in Article 1 CAT. 91 
Also the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture completely 
sets the term "severe pain or suffering" aside. Sentence 2 of its Article 2(1) states:92 
"Torture shall also be understood to be the use of methods upon a person intended to 
obliterate the personality of the victim or to diminish his physical or mental capacities, 
even if they do not cause physical pain or mental anguish." 
Because Article 1 CAT does not possess such a second sentence and it also requires in 
its definition "severe pain or suffering" one cannot renounce a certain level of pain or 
suffering. Ultimately, the wording sets the limit for the interpretation. Thus, it is not 
sufficient to consider only the purpose. To characterise an act as torture the act has to 
cause severe pain or suffering. 
3 Differentiation by means of purpose, taking into account the prerequisite of se-
verity 
However, one should scrutinize the wording of Article 1 and 16 CAT once more. 
Whereas Article 1 CAT demands an act of torture, which causes severe pain or suffer-
ing and which is committed with intent to achieve a purpose, Article 16 CAT requires 
other acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment which do not amount 
to torture. This wording in Article 16 could also mean acts, which cause severe pain or 
punishment, but which were not committed with intent and which are not motivated by 
a purpose because an act of other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment can not be an 
act which does not cause severe pain or suffering. To be characterized as cruel, inhuman 
89 Ibid. 
90 UNGA Resolution 3452 (XXX) (09 December 1975). 
91 Nowak, above n 73, 821. 
92 Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture (9 December 1985) OASTS 67, 25 ILM 
519,art2(1). 
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or degrading it has be to an act which causes a high level of pain or suffering.93 Thus, 
the words "other act of inhuman treatment" could describe an act which causes severe 
pain or suffering, but which is not necessarily committed with intent and does not 
achieve a purpose. Moreover, if a cruel, inhuman or degrading act needs to cause severe 
pain or suffering to be cruel, inhuman and degrading, how high does the level of pain 
have to be in order to describe an act as torture? Then only a few acts could amount to 
torture and this was not the idea behind the creation of the CAT. The aim was to protect 
people against torture but if one interprets torture as an aggravated form of CIDT, which 
demands also severe pain, the extent of protection is very limited which would be 
against the aim pursued. 
Thus, the main criterion to differentiate torture and CIDT has to be the purpose.94 
If one can say that an act is cruel, inhuman or degrading, then one has to qualify it as 
torture if the act was committed with intent and to achieve a purpose. Only a certain 
intensity of pain and suffering qualifies the act as cruel, inhuman or degrading. The 
main criterion, after the determination of the act as cruel, inhuman or degrading, is the 
purpose. 
Such an interpretation makes sense because it is mostly the purpose which moti-
vates the conduct.95 To achieve the purpose the tormentor has to break the will of his 
victim. Only by breaking the will does torture have its "special stigma"96 • Due to the 
fact that torture breaks the will of the victim torture is one of the most severe crimes in 
the world. Torture makes the victim a broken person, it takes away its personhood and 
something inside is destroyed forever. The helplessness to be at the tormentor's mercy, 
seems to be the worst thing about torture. To be at someone's mercy means that the vic-
tim has to follow another' s will because their own will is broken.97 Thus, the break of 
will and torture are intrinsically tied to each other. As said, the breaking of the will 
gives torture its special stigma. Because the tormentor breaks the victim's will only to 
achieve the purpose, thus it must be the purpose which leads to a higher blameworthi-
ness in comparison with other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. Therefore the 
purpose must be the main criterion for the differentiation between torture and CIDT. 
93 Nowak, above n 73 , 822 . 
94 Ibid. 
95 De Vos, above n I , 7. 
96 Rouillard, above n 70, 30. 
97 Thomas Bruha and Dominik Steiger Das Folterverbot im Volkerrecht (Kohlhammer, Stuttgart, 2006) 
29. 
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A further argument to attach more importance to the purpose is the following 
one: In certain instances severe suffering might be justifiable, such as "shooting a flee-
ing suspect in the leg if it was the only way to apprehend him"98 • Torture, however, can-
not be justified "since it contains an additional purposive element, that is ' the obtaining 
of information or confession, or infliction of punishment"'99 This means that torture is 
so reprehensible (more reprehensible than CIDT) because of the purpose. 
It is also worth noting that the UN decided not to describe torture as an aggra-
vated form of CIDT in the final version of the CAT as it was done before in Article 1 of 
the 1975 Declaration 100 which provided the basis for the CAT. 
Thus, one has to demand that the ECHR attaches more importance to the pur-
pose when it differentiates between torture and CIDT. A clear distinction between tor-
ture and CIDT can only be achieved by means of the purpose. If there is a certain level 
of pain or suffering which can be qualified as CIDT, and there is in addition intent and a 
purpose, the court has to determine that CIDT amounts to torture. Otherwise the door is 
left wide open for misuse. 
IV EXCEPTIONS TO THE TORTURE PROHIBITION 
The prohibition of torture in international law is not only dangerously threatened by 
narrow interpretations of the torture definition, but also by the requests of scholars, 
journalists and others to allow torture in exceptional cases to make new and extended 
defence warrants available to the state in times of terrorist threats. 
Some of those who request exceptions to the torture prohibition because of the 
fear of future terrorist attacks emphasise that torture should only be used in cases, where 
other possibilities to protect human lives are not available because of imminent danger. 
Pursuant to this view, torture should only be allowed in "ticking bomb scenarios" . 
Other proponents of exceptions to the torture prohibition go a step further and 
advocate exceptions to the torture prohibition to obtain information about future terror-
ist attacks from suspected terrorists. Contrary to the "ticking bomb scenario" there is 
indeed a threat of future terrorist attacks, but with these there is no imminent danger. 
98 De Vos, above n I, 4. 
99 Tbid. 
100 UNGA, above n 90. 
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The most common examples for the use of torture for preventive reasons are the inci-
dents at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay. 
Because of the incidents at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay and the continuous 
policy and legal debate it is worth discussing, whether exceptions to the torture prohibi-
tion could be made to hold off imminent danger, such as to prevent the death of hun-
dreds of people in a "ticking bomb scenario" and for preventive reasons, such as to ob-
tain information about future terrorist attacks. 
A The Prohibition of Torture in International Law 
At first the prohibition of torture in international law needs to be scrutinized. It is worth 
considering the extent of the prohibition of torture and whether exceptions could be 
made under the existing law. 
1 Development of the torture prohibition in international law 
The prohibition of torture has its seeds in the field of the humanitarian law in armed 
conflict. tot Article 4 of the Hague Convention102 of 1907 states that prisoners of war 
must be treated humanely. Here it "developed into a rule of customary law" 103 which 
does not allow torture of prisoners of war. 104 A formal torture prohibition was first es-
tablished in Article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 105 (UDHR), which 
is merely a resolution and is not binding in principle. 106 However, it is contentious as to 
what extent the UDHR and its included torture prohibition, are binding as customary 
international law or whether the prohibition of torture is even a part ofjus cogens. 
101 Rolf Kilhner "Torture" in Rudolf Bernhardt (ed) Encyclopaedia of Public International Law (Vol. 4, 
Elsevier, Amsterdam, 2000) 868, 869. 
102 Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land (18 October 1907), art 4. 
103 Customary international law results from a general and consistent practice of states (consuetudo) fol-
lowed by them from a sense of legal obligation (opinio juris). 
104 Kilhner, above n IOI , 869. 
105 UNGA Resolution 217 A (lII) ( I O December 1948), art 5. 
106 Malcom N. Shaw International Law (5 th ed, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003) 820, 90. 
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However, on the 21 October 1950 the first contractual and therefore binding tor-
ture prohibition became operative, under the four Geneva Conventions 1°7• Pursuant to its 
common Articles 1, it applies only in armed conflicts. In the same year the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 108 was 
signed initially by ten states. 109 It became operative on 3 September 1953 and nearly all 
European states are parties to that treaty with the exception of Belarus and the Vati-
can. 11 0 The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms was the first convention, which contains a general prohibition of torture and 
not just one for the law of war. A general prohibition of torture at universal level later 
became operative in 1976 with the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights 111 (ICCPR). Eleven years later a special anti-torture convention became operative 
- the CAT 112 • It was the first universally binding treaty, which defined the term of tor-
ture. 
2 Scope of the torture prohibition 
(a) Regulations: Anti-torture conventions and other treaties 
One can find regulations, which contain a binding torture prohibition, both at universal 
level and at regional levels. 
(i) Regulations at universal level 
As previously stated, the first international treaty, which contains a general prohibition 
of torture at universal level, was the ICCPR. Article 7 ICCPR contains the prohibition 
of torture, which states that "[n]o one shall be subjected to torture [ ... ]" 11 3 and pursuant 
107 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (12 August 1949) 75 UNTS 135, 
art 3(1)(a), 17(4), 87(3); Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (12 
August 1949) 75 UNTS 287, art 3(l)(a), 32, 147; Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of 
the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field 75 UNTS 31 , art 12; Convention for the Amelio-
ration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea (12 
August 1949) 75 UNTS 85 , art 12. 
108 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (4 November 
1950) 213 UNTS 221 . (Commonly called the European Convention on Human Rights). 
109 Denmark, Norway, Ireland, Germany, Sweden, United Kingdom, Iceland, Saar (member of the Coun-
cil of Europe), Greece and Luxembourg. Jochen Abr. Frowein and Wolfgang Peukert, EMRK-
Kommentar (2nd ed, N.P. Engel Verlag, Arlington, 1996) 762. 
11 0 Bruha and Steiger, above n 97, 10. 
111 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (19 December 1966) 999 UNTS 171. [ICCPR] 
11 2 CAT, above n 3. 
11 3 1CCPR, above n 111 , art 7. 
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to Article 4(2) ICCPR 114 the right not to be subjected to torture is one from which no 
derogation is permissible. 
The aforementioned special convention is the CAT 115 • It defines the term of tor-
ture, as seen above, in its Article l 116 and provides in its following articles for a complex 
rule type to fight torture 117• 
For example, Article 2 states that "State Parties shall take effective legislative, 
administrative, judicial or other measures to prevent acts of torture in any territory under 
its jurisdiction" 11 8• As well as the ICCPR, the CAT disallows in its Article 2(2) 11 9 the 
derogation of the torture prohibition. Article 3 120 forbids the extradition of persons 
which are in danger of becoming tortured in their home country. Articles 4 to 8121 com-
mit the State Parties to make torture a punishable offence. Pursuant to Article 12 122 
every State Party has to ensure the initiation of investigations in the cases where there 
are reasonable indications for torture. Article 13 123 concerns the protection of the victim 
and their relatives when they want to complain about an incident of torture. Pursuant to 
Article 15 "a statement which is established to have been made as a result of torture 
shall not be invoked as evidence in any proceedings [ ... ]" 124. 
Articles 17 to 24 125 contain institutional regulations and regulations about the 
proceeding: Article 17 demands a committee against torture, which is in charge of the 
proceeding after a State Party ' s claim that "another Party is not fulfilling its obligations" 
under the CAT and of complaints from individuals, which complain that their right not 
be tortured, was violated. If the Committee obtains reasonable information about inci-
dents of torture, it can investigate on its own initiative (Article 20) 126• 
The content of the CAT shows that the protection against torture is taken seri-
ously. However, at universal level, only the states, which are parties to the CAT and the 
ICCPR, are bound by their contents. All other states are not bound. Prohibition of tor-
ture does not apply to all states which are not parties to the ICCPR and CAT. 
11 4 Tbid, art 4(2). 
11 5 CAT, above n 3. 
11 6 Ibid, art 1. 
117 Bruha and Steiger, above n 97, 13 . 
11 8 CAT, above n 3, art 2. 
11 9 Ibid, art 2(2). 
120 Tbid , art 3. 
12 1 Ibid, art 4 - 8. 
122 Ibid, art 12. 
123 Ibid , art13 . 
124 Ibid, art 15. 
125 Ibid, 17 - 24 . 
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(ii) Regional regulations 
However, a large number of binding regional torture prohibitions do exist and contrib-
ute to an effective proscription of torture. A few of them possess a well developed and 
effective system of legal protection. 
• America 
In America torture is prohibited by a special convention, the Inter-American Convention 
to Prevent and Punish Torture 127 and by Article 5 of the American Convention on Hu-
man Rights 128 (ACHR). 
Pursuant to Article 63 ACHR129 the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 
based in Costa Rica, is in charge of enforcement of the torture prohibition stated in Ar-
ticle 5 ACHR. 
• Europe 
In Europe the prohibition of torture is regularised in Article 3 of the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights (ECHR), which states that " [n]o one shall be subjected to torture 
[ .. . ]"
130
• A derogation from the torture prohibition of the ECHR is not permissible pursu-
ant to its Article 15(2)131• It also belongs to the European ordre public. 132 The ECHR 
features a well developed system of legal protection. The Protocol 11 , which came into 
force on 01 November 1998, allows individuals to take their case directly to the Euro-
pean Court of Human Right. This has significantly increased the effectiveness of human 
rights protection. 
Also the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment133 (ECPT) refers in its preamble to the torture pro-
hibition of Article 3 ECHR. It features rules, which allow a committee to visit places 
where people are deprived of their liberty. The aim of the ECPT is to avert the accrue-
126 Ibid art 20 
127 Tnt:r-Ame;ican Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture, above n 92 . 
128 American Convention on Human Rights (21 November 1969) 1144 UNTS 123 , art 5. 
129 Ibid, art 63 . 
13° Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ( 4 November 1950) 213 
UNTS 221 , art 3. (commonly called European Convention on Human Rights) 
13 1 Ibid, art 15 (2). 
132 Markus Raess Der Schutz vor Falter im Volkerrecht (Schulthess Polygraphischer Verlag, Zurich, 
1989) 62. 
133 European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punish-
ment (26 November 1987) ETS 126, 27 ILM 1152. 
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ment of torture. Thus, it has a preventive impact, which complements the repressive 
system of the ECHR. 
• Africa 
One can find in Article 5 of the African Charter on Human and People's Rights (so 
called Banjul-Charter)134 a binding torture prohibition. The African Court on Human and 
People' s Rights is in charge of its enforcement. 
Indeed, where human rights violations and especially torture are common occur-
rences, the Banjul-Charter is by African standards, a considerable progress. However, 
its usefulness must be considered as not too high from the outset because 80 percent of 
the population are illiterates. Thus, the work of human rights organisations is all the 
more important. 135 
• Asian and Islamic-Arabian countries 
There is no binding regional prohibition of torture in Asian or Islamic-Arabian coun-
tries.1 36 However, the Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Right137 features a torture 
prohibition. Its Article 7 states: 138 
"No person shall be subjected to torture in mind or body, or degraded, or threatened 
with injury either to himself or to anyone related to or to held dear by him, or forcibly 
made to confess to the commission of crime, or forced to consent to an act which is in-
jurious to his interests ." 
This declaration is not a declaration of all Islamic states. It was adopted at a conference 
about human rights within Islam, which was arranged by the Islamic Council of Europe. 
Thus, one cannot speak about a binding and accepted convention from Islamic states. 
The same applies to the Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam139, it is also not 
binding. 
134 African Charter on Human and People 's Rights (27 June 1981) 1520 UNTS 217, art. 5. 
135 Raess, above n 132, 67 . 
136 Bruha and Steiger, above n 97, 19. 
137 Islamic Declaration on Human Rights 21 Dhul Qaidah I 40 I ( 19 September I 991 ). 
138 Ibid art 7 
139 O.I.C. Re~olution 49/ 19-P (5 August 1990). 
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(iii) Intermediate result 
Indeed, numerous states are parties to the universal regulations, ICCPR and CAT. There 
are also regional regulations as a protection against torture in most parts of the world. 
Nevertheless, there are enough countries which are not a party to a universal regulation 
and which do not feature a regional regulation against torture. Thus, the protection of 
such an important human right - the right to live free from torture - is patchy. The law 
of treaties does not guarantee an all-embracing protection against torture. 
(b) The torture prohibition as part of customary international law and as part of jus 
cogens 
In any case, the gaps which came into existence when some states did not become a 
party to international or regional treaties could be seen as closed if the prohibition of 
torture is a part of customary international law because then it is binding for all states 
independent of a state's accession to a treaty. 
Moreover, it is questionable whether the prohibition of torture is a peremptory 
norm in international law, that is, a part of jus cogens. The content of norms ofjus co-
gens are so important that they cannot become abolished by arrangement or declaration. 
(i) Torture prohibition as customary international law 
Pursuant to the predominant view, two prerequisites are necessary to speak about the 
prohibition of torture as a norm of customary international law: a general and consistent 
state practice and opinio jurisN° - the requirement that the states "comply with the norm 
against torture out of a sense of legal obligation"141 • Whether the prohibition of torture 
features these two elements is now examined. 
140 Anthony Aust Handbook of International Law (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005) 6, 7; 
Rudolf Bernhardt "Customary International Law" in Rudolf Bernhardt (ed) Encyclopaedia of Public 
International law (Vol. I, North Holland, Amsterdam, 1992) 898, 899; Joshua A. Decker "Is the 
United States Bound by the Customary International Law of Torture? A Proposal for A TS Litigation 
in the War on Terror" (2006) 6 Chi. J. Int'I L 803,816. 
141 Joshua A. Decker, above n 140, 820. 
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• State practice? 
State practice demands for a practice which is both extensive and virtually uniform . 142 
Today the duration of the practice is not longer seen as pivotal; it is more important that 
the practice is intensive and uniform. 143 For the criterion of uniformity it is necessary 
that a representative number of states behave as far as possibly the same as to a certain 
matter. 144 It is not necessary that all states adhere to the prohibition of torture without 
exception. If there are deviations in particular cases, these deviations are seen as viola-
tions of international law. 145 
Indications of the states' stance on the prohibition of torture can be gathered 
from whether the prohibition is generally entrenched, be it by ratifications of treaties or 
by inclusion into constitutions or general statutes. 146 State practice can also be expressed 
by "governmental actions in relation to other states, [ ... and] ministerial and other offi-
cial statements" 147, "'by the general usage and practice of nations; or by judicial deci-
sions recognizing and enforcing that law"' 148 et cetera. 
In the realm of humanitarian law nearly all states in the world are bound by the 
torture prohibition of the Geneva Convention. Also in the realm of general international 
law there are only a few states, which are not bound by one or more universal or re-
gional conventions or other treaties, which feature a torture prohibition. The numerous 
accessions to conventions and other treaties reveal that the majority of states embrace a 
prohibition of torture. 149 Also the majority of constitutions feature an express torture 
prohibition or prohibit certain acts, which are tantamount to torture. Often a prohibition 
of torture can (also) be deduced from the protection of physical integrity which is in-
cluded in nearly all constitutions or statutes. Moreover, no state exists which allows the 
use of torture. Even within armed conflicts no state has ever claimed that it is allowed to 
torture. 150 Indeed, some states torture. However, these states confronted with the viola-
tion of international law always want to make clear that they did not torture. This sup-
142 Knut Ipsen Volkerrecht (5 th ed, C.H.Beck, Munich 2004) 215. 
143 Bernhardt, above n 140, 901. 
144 Aust, above n 140, 7. 
145 lpsen, aboven 142,2 16. 
146 Raess, above n 132, 74. 
147 Aust, above n 140, 7. 
148 Decker, above n 140, 817. 
149 The Prosecutor v Anto Furundzija (Judgment) (10 December 1998) IT-95-17/1-T para 138 (Trial 
Chamber, ICTY); available at: www.un .org/icty/furundzija/trialc2 / judgement/index.htm (last ac-
cessed: 11 May 2008). 
150 Ibid. 
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ports acceptance of the torture prohibition. 151 Thus, as to the prohibition of torture a state 
practice is established. 
• Opinio Juris? 
"Once one has established the existence of a specified usage, it becomes necessary to 
consider how the state views its own behaviour" 152 • Opinio Juris describes the basic po-
sition that certain behaviour patterns have to be maintained. It is the persistent belief 
that certain behaviour (the state practice) is necessary because it is seen to be legal. 153 In 
the case of an omission as state practice (omission of torture), the omission has to be 
based on the conviction to be legally obligated. 154 An omission for other reasons is not 
sufficient. However, the existence of opinio Juris is often difficult to find. One is often 
constrained to use the same evidences used to prove the existence of a state practice. 155 
The intensive contractual fixing of the torture prohibition, its repeated affirma-
tion in resolutions and declarations of the United Nations, the fact that no state con-
fronted with the violation of the torture provision claims that it is allowed to torture, and 
the existence of torture prohibitions in most of the legal systems show that there is a 
general conviction that torture is forbidden. The prerequisite of opinio Juris can be taken 
for granted. 
Also persistent violations of the torture prohibition do not question its accep-
tance because these violations are not committed with the thought that it is legal. 
As to the prohibition of torture there is a state practice and the existence of 
opinio Juris, so it is part of customary international law. The prohibition of torture is 
therefore legally binding for all states. Thus, it closes the gaps which came into exis-
tence when some states did not became a party to international or regional treaties. 
Admittedly, the prohibition of torture achieves by its status as customary law a 
far-ranging validity, but ultimately it is not an absolute. "If a state does not consent to 
be bound by an international norm, if it persistently objects, the state cannot be held 
liable for violating the norm once it crystallizes into customary international law." 156 
151 Ibid. 
152 Malcom N. Shaw International law (4 th ed, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997) 66. 
153 Ibid, 67; Ipsen, above n 142,218. 
154 Ipsen, above n 142, 219. 
155 Decker, above n 140, 820. 
156 Ibid .. 
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However, it is assumed that in practice none of the states would expressly oppose the 
prohibition of torture. 
(ii) Torture - a peremptory norm Gus cogens) 
The question also arises whether the prohibition of torture is not only part of customary 
international law, but also a peremptory norm, jus cogens. As previously stated, this 
would mean that the prohibition of torture cannot become abolished by arrangement or 
declaration. When a norm ofjus cogens conflicts with a norm of a treaty or a customary 
rule,jus cogens-norms prevail over a treaty and customary rules.157 According to Article 
53 of the Vienna Convention158 a treaty is void if it conflicts with a norm of jus cogens. 
Also a consistent violation, that is, a persistent objection, cannot be "viewed as evidence 
against their CIL [ customary international law] status, but rather is disregarded as mere 
law breaking" 159• "Non-compliance, even if widespread, does not impeach the prerequi-
site state custom."160 Only a norm of the same status, that is another norm of jus cogens, 
could suspend protection of the first norm of jus cogens. 161 If one acknowledges the 
prohibition of torture as a norm of jus cogens, one can speak about an "absolute" prohi-
bition of torture. 
It is controversial which norms in international law are part of jus cogens. 162 
"There is [also] little agreement about the source of jus cogens-norms: where do they 
come from [ ... ]?" 163 However, the term ''jus cogens" found its way into the Vienna Con-
vention 164 • Its Article 53 states: 165 
"[A )peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted and recognized by 
the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is 
permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general interna-
tional law having the same character." 
157 Alex Conte An Introduction to International Law (LexisNexis NZ Limited, Wellington, 2006) 38. 
158 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (23 May 1969) 1155 UNTS 331 , art 53. 
159 Curtis A. Bradley and Jack L. Goldsmith "Customary International Law as Federal Common Law; A 
Critique of the Modem Position" ( 1997)110 Harv. L. Rev. 815 , 840. 
160 Decker, above 140, 821 . 
16 1 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, above n 158, art 53 . 
162 Pamela J. Stephens "A Categorical Approach to Human Rights Claims : Jus Cogens as a Limitation on 
Enforcement" (2004) 22 Wis . lnt ' I. L. J. 245 ,252. 
163 Ibid, 249 . 
164 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, above 158. 
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The Vienna Convention of Treaties does not help on to find out which norms are part of 
jus cogens. 166 It is restricted to describe the effect of ajus cogens-norm. Thus, it has to 
be clarified in a different way which attributes constitute a norm of jus cogens and 
whether the prohibition of torture features these attributes. 
If one refers to the wording of Article 53 Vienna Convention stating thatjus co-
gens is "a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a 
whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted" 167, it is apparent that for the 
existence of jus cogens an element of consent to such norm is necessary. 168 Pursuant to 
Klein "jus cogens embraces customary laws considered binding on all nations [ ... ]"169, 
but it is a particular category of customary law - "a kind of ' super-customary law"' 170 • It 
is "' customary law that is ordered to a transcendent good of the international commu-
nity"'111. Although the roots of jus cogens are seen in custom, norms of }us cogens are 
characterized by moral force, "which derives from their rational foundation".172 Klein 
states that "since nations do observe jus cogens, seek to enforce it upon each other, and 
deny their own violations of it, they pay homage to its moral force and informally ratify 
and authorize its application." 173 These acts of ratification and authorization cause a 
"rule of recognition" 174. 
Christensen said that "a norm is peremptory when it meets criteria designed to 
serve an overriding community purpose structurally differentiated from that served by 
ordinary rules of treaty and custom" 175 . Thus, ajus cogens-norm protects vital interests 
of the international community 176 so that it is a norm, which is of fundamental impor-
tance. Furthermore it has to be indispensable for all states and it also has to be en-
trenched in their legal attitude. 177 
165 Ibid, art 53 . 
166 Jochen Abr. Frohwein "Jus Cogens" in Rudolf Bernhardt ( ed) Encyclopaedia of Public International 
Law (Vol. 3, Elsevier, Amsterdam, 1997) 65, 66. 167 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, above n 15 8, art 53 . 168 Stephens, above n 162, 249; Mary E. Turpel and Phillippe Sand "Peremptory International Law and 
Souvereignty: Some Questions" (1988) 3 Conn . J. lnt ' l L. 364, 367. 169 David F. Klein "A Theory for the Application of the Customary International Law of Human Rights 
by Domestic Courts" (1988) 13 Yale J. lnt ' I L. 332, 350,351. 170 Stephens, above n 162, 250. 
171 Klein, above n 169, 351. 
172 Stephens, above n 162, 250. 
173 Klein , above n 169, 351. 
174 See ibid , 351 , 352. 
175 Gordon A. Christenson "Jus Cogens: Guarding Interests Fundamental to International Society" ( 1988) 
28 Va. J. lnt ' I L. 585, 592. 
176 Carin Kahgan "Jus Cogens and the Inherent Right to Selfdefence" (1997) 3 ILSA J. Int ' I & Comp L 
767, 774. 
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Do these attributes apply to the prohibition of torture? The global unconditional 
reprobation of torture reflects the existing ethical consents that torture destroys every-
thing that makes us a human being. The prohibition of torture protects the physical in-
tegrity and also that, what is inside of a human being - the personhood itself. Because 
torture spurns not only human dignity, but also destroys long-lastingly the psyche of a 
human being, the prohibition of torture protects a vital interest. The use of torture dam-
ages not only the victim, but also leads to a brutalisation within a state. Due to the fact 
that all over the world torture is considered extremely cruel because torture causes ex-
treme physical and mental torment, the prohibition of torture features a certain moral 
force. Thus, torture offends against the ordre public of the community based on interna-
tional law. Also the torture prohibition belongs at the core of human rights. Meanwhile 
it has achieved a similar status as the prohibition of genocide, slavery, racial discrimina-
tion and aggression, 178 which are all undisputed norms of jus cogens. Moreover, torture 
is a crime against humanity. The torturer becomes a hostis hurnani generis. 
Thus, all this shows that the torture prohibition is a norm of }us cogens and this 
view is also supported by many scholars 179 • 
3 Intermediate Result 
The prohibition of torture has become not only a part of international customary law but 
also a part of jus cogens. 180 Thus, the torture prohibition can be classified as absolute. 
Pursuant to existing international law, exceptions to the torture prohibition are under no 
circumstances, possible. 
B Exceptions to the Torture Prohibition because of the Wording in Sentence 2 
of Article 1(1) CAT 
Because it turned out that exceptions to the torture prohibition are not possible under 
existing international law the question arises whether the CAT itself allows for an ex-
ception to the torture prohibition in its sentence 2 of Article 1 (1) CAT. 
177 BVerfGE 18, 441, 448, 449. 
178 Alexander Orakhelashvili Peremptory Norms in International Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2006) 54 . 
179 For example: Aust, above 140, 11 ; Bradley and Goldsmith , above n 159, 840; Erika de Wet "The 
Prohibition of Torture as an International Norm of Jus Cogens and its Implications for National and 
Customary Law" (2004) 15 EJTL 97 . Paul R. Dubinsky "Human Rights Law Meets Private Law Har-
monization : The Coming Conflict" (2005) 30 Yale J. Int'I L. 211,275. 
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Pursuant to sentence 2 of Article 1 ( 1) CAT the term torture "does not include 
pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions" 181 . It is 
questionable how this sentence is to be understood. 
One could assume that this sentence provides possibilities to allow acts of tor-
ture by law. However, if one assumes this possibility the CAT's prohibition of torture 
would not make sense. Such interpretation would make it possible for states to create 
numerous exceptions to the torture prohibition. However, this is not the aim of the CAT. 
Thus, the term "lawful sanctions" can only mean sanctions which are consistent with 
the existing international law. Sanctions would not be consistent with international law 
if they allow something which is forbidden by the convention. Moreover, such an inter-
pretation of this sentence would also conflict with Article 2(2) CAT 182, which states that 
exceptions to the prohibition of torture are under no circumstances permissible. 183 
It was often argued that the second sentence of Article 1 (1) CAT was included 
because "it was intended to strengthen the already existing prohibition of torture in in-
ternational law", but it was not intended to lead to a reform of the state parties' systems 
of penal sanctions. 184 Without the second sentence in Article 1 (1) CAT an accession to 
the CAT would not have been possible for some countries. 185 One has to think of coun-
tries, whose systems of penal sanctions are based on the Shari'a. 186 To except lawful 
sanction may be "'the result of political compromises intended to allow particular forms 
of punishment, such as the death penalty, without undermining the core principles of the 
CAT'"181 
Thus, also sentence 2 of Article 1 (1) CAT does not allow for exceptions to the 
torture prohibition. It proves that the torture prohibition is absolute and that exceptions 
are not possible under existing international law. 
180 Johan D. van der Vyver "Torture as Crime under International Law" (2003) 67 Alb. L. Rev. 427, 429. 181 CAT, above n 3, art 1 (I). 
182 Ibid, art 2(2). 
183 Bruha and Steiger, above n 97, 33. 
184 Burgers and Danelius, above n 69, 121. 
185 Ibid, 121. 
186 Bruha and Steiger, above n 97, 33 . 
187 Lim, above n 5, 97. 
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V RETHINKING THE ABSOLUTE VALIDITY OF THE TORTURE PRO-
HIBITION IN TIMES OF "WAR ON TERROR" 
Because exceptions to the prohibition of torture are not possible under existing interna-
tional law every act of torture would be a violation of the international law. However, in 
times of "war on terror" it is worth rethinking the absolute validity of the torture prohi-
bition. The changed security-political situation raises the question of whether it should 
be permissible to allow exceptions to the torture prohibition in times of "war on terror". 
Therefore approaches to justify torture to hold off imminent danger and the use of tor-
ture for preventative reasons are discussed below. 
A Use of Torture to Hold Off Imminent Danger - the "Ticking Bomb Sce-
nario" 
One situation where it may be possible to justify torture is the case of the "ticking bomb 
scenario". The "ticking bomb scenario" not only describes the situation where a bomb 
hidden by terrorists threatens to kill hundreds of people, but also a situation where there 
is no other choice but to use torture, "in the limited period of time available to prevent 
anticipated damage" 188 • This paper deals only with the hidden bomb as the model-case. 
Often objections are raised if one uses such a clear and rare case as a model case 
to examine whether exceptions to the torture prohibition should be allowed. It is 
claimed that such cases are out of touch with everyday life and that it is irresponsible to 
question the absolute prohibition of torture with such "pseudo-realistic cases" and that 
findings gained by means of "such pseudo-realistic cases" perhaps cannot be transferred 
to reality. 189 
However, such objections are mistaken. People who cannot think of one case 
where torture could be allowed must agree to be confronted with all imaginable cases, 
which question their opinion. 190 Admittedly cases in real life are often not so clear. The 
risk of misuse or even "slippery slope" must be taken seriously. However, these con-
cerns should not bar us from analysing the question of whether, from a legal perspec-
tive, a justification of torture to save hundreds of lives is tenable under certain circum-
stances. In a second step one can consider the risks which could possibly follow from 
188 Emanuel Gross "Legal Aspects of Tackling Terrorism: The Balance between the Right of a Democ-
racy to Defend Itself and the Protection of Human Rights" (2001) 6 UCLA J. lnt'l L. & For. Aff. 89, 
102. 
189 Luban, above n 45, 1427, 1440 ff. 
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such exceptions and consider them as too high. Slippery slope-arguments are of a utili-
tarian nature. Everybody, who attempts to scotch the individual right or obligations un-
der reference to utilitarian arguments, does not follow a legal maxim. 191 
Because of space and brevity only three selected approaches should be discussed 
to justify torture to hold off imminent danger: the "Torture Warrant" approach of the 
Harvard law Professor Alan Dershowitz; the "Necessity" used for example by the Su-
preme Court of Israel; and the so-called "Self-defence Torture" approach of German 
law Professor Reinhard Merkel. 
1 "Torture Warrants" - the Dershowitz approach 
To justify torture to obtain the necessary information in a "ticking bomb scenario", Der-
showitz proposes so-called "torture warrants": "a process whereby a neutral magistrate 
would decide whether there was sufficient evidence to compel a suspect to be subject to 
torture" 192. Because torture cannot be averted, one has to bring it under control and for 
this reason Dershowitz demands "torture warrants" to make sure that torture is only 
used under authorisation by a court. 193 One advantage is seen in the fact that torture 
would be medically supervised and that techniques chosen would not cause permanent 
physical damage. For example, he proposes to insert a long needle under the finger-
nail,194 what causes hellacious pain but not permanent physical damage. Dershowitz 
takes the position that torture is inevitable in a "ticking bomb scenario" and thus we can 
choose between two evils: torture "off the books and below the radar screen" 195 or in-
cluded as a lawful method by "torture warrants". For him the latter is the lesser evil. 
Counter arguments suggest that torture violates not only the human dignity, but 
also judicially permitted torture "taints the 'purity of the courts'". 196 By granting a "tor-
ture warrant", which inescapably leads to a violation of human dignity, the judiciary is 
participating in abuses of human dignity. "The underlying goals of judicial integrity are 
190 Merkel, above n 41,379. 191 Ibid, 379, 380. 
192 
Alan M, Dershowitz Why Terrorism Works: Understanding the Threat, Responding to the Challenge 
(Yale University Press, New Heaven, 2002) 148; quoted from Moher, above n 23,484. 193 Alan M. Dershowitz "The Torture Warrant: A Response to Professor Strauss" (2003/2004) 48 N.Y.L. 
Sch. L. Rev 275,283. 194 See Moher, above n 23, 484. 195 Dershowitz, above n 193, 292 196 Chanterelle Sung "Book Review: Torturing the Ticking Bomb Terrorist: An Analysis of Judicially 
Sanctioned Torture in the Context of Terrorism: Why Terrorism Works: Understanding the Threat, 
Responding to the Challenge. By Alan Dershowitz" (2003) 23 B.C. Third World L.J. 193,207. 
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that the court is to be regarded as a symbol of lawfulness and justice and that the court 
does not ally itself with bad acts" 197 If a judge is involved in an abuse of human dignity 
by granting "torture warrants", this would destroy the image of lawfulness and justice. 
Thus, citizens would lose confidence in the judiciary. Moreover, the task of a court is to 
show people what is right and what is wrong and thus it should set a good example. 
A further problem is that "torture warrants", which are granted by a judge, 
would create the impression in society that torture is a "good thing" and furthermore 
lawful. 198 However, an abuse of human dignity cannot be described as lawful. Thus, 
within society the wrong idea could be evoked, namely that if even the state allows tor-
ture, torture cannot be so bad and this leads to a brutalization of society. Therefore the 
concept of "torture warrants" has to be rejected. 
2 "Necessity" 
Now the defence of necessity is discussed particularly whether it justifies the use of 
torture in a "ticking bomb scenario". "The [necessity] doctrine holds that certain con-
duct, though it violates the law and produces a harm, is justified because it averts a 
greater evil and hence produces a net social gain or benefit to society" 199 or as Glanville 
Williams says: "some acts that would otherwise be wrong are rendered rightful by a 
good purpose, or by the necessity of choosing the lesser of two evils"200• 
For the application of the necessity defence six prerequisites are necessary: (a) 
the defendant acted to prevent imminent harm, (b) he was "faced with a choice of evils 
and decided for the lesser evil", ( c) "that he reasonably anticipated a causal relationship 
between his conduct and the harm to be avoided"; and ( d) "that there were no other le-
gal alternatives to violation the law"201 • Further "the Legislature has not acted to pre-
clude the defence by a clear and deliberate choice regarding the values at issue"202 (e); 
and (f) that the circumstances, which led to the necessity, may not be caused "by negli-
gent or recklessness acts of the defendant in the first instance"203 • 
197 Ibid. 
198 Ibid, 208 . 
199 John Alan Cohan "Torture and the Necess ity Doctrine" (2007) 41 Val. U.L. Rev. 1587, 1607. 200 Glanville Williams The Sanctity of life and the Criminal law (Knopf, New York, 1957) 198. 20 1 Cohan, n I 99, 1610. 
202 Ibid . 
203 Ibid . 
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These prerequisites are examined to see if they are fulfilled in the "ticking bomb 
scenario". 
(a) Imminent Harm Factor 
The first requirement for the application of the necessity defence is that the defendant 
wanted to prevent imminent harm. One can speak about imminent harm when the 
threatened harm "is temporarily quite proximate to the present moment"204 If there is no 
imminent harm, there will be enough time to use other methods to avert the "future" 
harm, such as traditional investigations. However, to determine whether the "imminent 
harm factor" is fulfilled one has also to consider the degree of harm that should be 
averted. If the degree of harm is extreme, as it is in the case of a ticking (nuclear) bomb, 
which may kill hundreds or thousands of people, then one cannot make too heavy a de-
mand on imminence. Possibly five days till the explosion could be sufficient to speak 
about an imminent danger,205 but probably not two weeks. Thus, the imminent factor is 
generally fulfilled in the "ticking bomb scenario". 
(b) "Choice-of-Evils Factor"206 
The question is whether the use of torture is the lesser evil in a "ticking bomb scenario". 
Already on the "Choice-of-Evils Factor" the application of the necessity defence in the 
"ticking bomb scenario" could fail. At first glance this may not make sense because by 
the use of torture the death of hundreds of people could be averted. 
A second glance will recognize that the use of torture is not the lesser evil of the 
two. There are a few more points to consider in assessing the choice of evils. 
One of those points is the impact that the use of torture might have on the repu-
tation of the country. A state, which allows torture, cannot be taken seriously, if it asks 
for support in its "war on terror" and against human rights violations. Admittedly, all 
states are dependent on the aid of other states in their fight against terrorism. Whether 
other states are willing to support so cruel way to fight against terrorism is questionable. 
204 Ibid, 1616. 
205 See Mordechai Kremnitzer "The Landau Commission Report - Was the Security Service Subordinated 
to the Law, or the Law to the "Needs" of the Security Service?" (1989) 23 lsr. L. Rev. 216,253. 206 Cohan, above n 199, 1612. 
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Another concern is that the enemies of the torturing state could take revenge so 
that they kidnap and mistreat the citizens of the torturing state because their own citi-
zens were mistreated. As we have seen, in 2004, after the horrible pictures of the detain-
ees at Abu Ghraib were presented to the public, "Islamist militants abducted [ ... ] an 
American working in Saudi Arabia, in order to inflict the same abuse that had been in-
flicted on Iraqi detainees"207. Ultimately, a video was presented world wide which 
showed that the American was beheaded by his kidnapper. Also the experiences in Is-
rael and Palestinia show that the use of torture leads to a vicious circle: terrorism was 
considered to justify torture, whereas torture was considered to justify further terror-
ism2os. 
Also slippery-slope-effects have to be considered. If torture is allowed in excep-
tional cases and thus institutionalized, it will "become the norm rather than the excep-
tion"209. The exception becomes a "precedent" which will be applied to other more or 
less similar cases. Torture, which was intended to be used in exceptional cases, such as 
"ticking bomb scenarios", will automatically be extended to other cases. For example, 
why not extend the "use of torture on someone who likely knows the name or where-
abouts of a serial killer"210 and refuses to provide the information? A sole exception be-
comes a realm of exceptions, in which torture should be allowed to avert danger. The 
limits of such exceptions cannot be defined precisely. Everything speaks for the as-
sumption that the zone, in which torture is allowed, will grow and that the separating 
line between allowed methods and forbidden methods will shift more and more. 
If the limit set by the international prohibition of torture is abolished, there is no 
stopping then. The idea that one can allow torture in exceptional cases and that one can 
at the same time keep it within a limit is a contradiction in terms. Beyond the prohibi-
tion of torture there are no plausible lines of demarcation which can withstand the pres-
sure of preventing danger. Thus, the idea that there are moral or legal criteria by which 
torture can be on the one hand allowed but on the other hand kept within a limit, is ab-
surd. 
207 Ibid, 1614. 
208 Barak Cohen "Democracy and the Mis-rule of Law: The Israeli Legal System's Failure To Prevent 
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Another slippery slope effect is the concern as to the escalation of the brutality 
of torture techniques. 211 How can the limits be set? What is if torture is necessary, which 
poses a risk of severe and long-lasting physical damage or even the risk to death? Or if 
it is necessary to inflict the torture on the terrorists family? A former CIA agent pro-
posed considering relatives as the target: 212 
"You get their mothers and their brothers and their sisters under your complete control, 
and then you make that known to the target [ ... ] You imply or you directly threaten 
[that] his family is going to pay the price ifhe makes the wrong decision." 
( c) Intermediate result 
There are many points to consider which show that allowing torture in a "ticking bomb 
scenario" is not the lesser evil. Thus, an exception to the torture prohibition in the "tick-
ing bomb scenario" under reference to the necessity defence is not possible. 
3 "Seif-defence Torture" - the Merkel approach 
Whether the use of torture in a "ticking bomb scenario" can be justified by self-defence 
and whether the self-defence principle speaks for an exception to the torture prohibition 
is now examined. 
(a) Prerequisites of self-defence 
At first there has to be a state of self-defence in the "ticking bomb scenario". In both the 
common law states and in Germany, the criminal law contains self-defence. There are 
two possible scenarios: At first literally, where the act of defence is committed by the 
victim of an attack and second the defence of others, where the act of "self'-defence is 
committed by a third person in favour of the victim. 213 In Germany the state of self-
defence is characterised by an actual or imminent attack214 • Further the act has to be re-
211 Ibid. 
212 Bob Drogin and Greg Miller "Spy Agencies Facing Questions of Tactics" (28 October 2001) L.A. 
TIMES, Los Angeles § I, at I. 
213 See the Definition of Self-Defence in: R. v Williams (1987) 3 All E.R. 411,415; R. v Beckford(1987) 
3 All E.R. 425, 425; in German Law: Kristian Kilhl Strafrecht Allgemeiner Tei/ (5 th ed, Vahlen Ver-
lag, Munich, 2005) 147. 
214 Kiihl, above 213, I 08. 
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quired as necessary to avert imminent unlawful assault.215 Under common law one is 
justified in using force "only in response to a threat of death or serious bodily harm, 
only if the danger is imminent and immediately forthcoming, and in some states [ ... ] 
only if there is no available path of safe retreat."216 These prerequisites are fulfilled in 
the "ticking bomb scenario". Under the doctrine of self-defence killing someone is al-
lowed if it is necessary to save your own life or the lives of others. 217 "If we can kill in 
defence of self or others, certainly we could take action short of that - like torture to 
obtain critical information - in defence of others". 218 
A further advantage in contrast to the necessity defence is that self-defence is 
only allowed towards the attacker (here: terrorist), not towards a third party, such as 
their relatives. 
(b) Concerns as to "self-defence-torture" from a legal perspective - Is there a viola-
tion of the terrorist's human dignity? 
It is also assumed that the human dignity of the terrorist would be violated by torture 
committed in self-defence. 
( c) Considering criteria of attribution in criminal law 
Consulting general principles of criminal law will show, that concerns as to a violation 
of human dignity in the case of "self-defence-torture" do not exist or not to that extent 
compared to "torture warrants". Moreover, it could turn out that a state, which denies 
the right of self-defence in cases where only an act of torture is helpful to defend hun-
dreds of lives, not only misconstrues its primary task to guarantee basic rights, such as 
right to life,219 but also "de facto" (objectively) aids unjust acts220• Therefore an excep-
tion to the torture prohibition in the case of "self-defence" seems from a legal perspec-
tive not so far off anymore. 
The consideration of criteria of attribution may appear strange or alien to stu-
dents and scholars in common law countries. However, these criteria can help us answer 
215 German Penal Code, § 32. 
216 Marcy Strauss "Torture" (2003 /2004) 48 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 201,258. 217 Ibid. 
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the following questions: Who is responsible for an act and the result, which is caused by 
the act? Who creates the danger that caused the result? 
• The terrorist is responsible for the act of torture and he has to be considered as if 
he inflicts the pain upon himself 
Considering the criteria of attribution in criminal law, the pain, which is caused by the 
act of torture committed in self-defence, has to be attributed to the terrorist's sphere of 
responsibility. He has the factual taking place of the pain or its absence or its cessation 
in his hand. He can supply the information, which is necessary to find and to deactivate 
the bomb so that hundreds of people can be saved. As soon as he supplies the informa-
tion the acts of torture will end and hence the pain. Furthermore, he is legally obligated 
to behave in a way (to supply the information) that this pain ceases instantly, namely 
with the strongest duty of a citizen: the duty not to kill other people. 221 
If this thesis, that the pain from the act of torture is attributed to the terrorist's 
sphere of responsibility, is true and if it has to be considered as if the terrorist has in-
flicted the pain upon himself, it would be difficult to speak about a violation of human 
dignity by the state, because the terrorist inflicts the pain upon himself. One cannot look 
upon him as an object, because he has it in his power to stop the act of torture and thus 
the pain as well. Thus, it is not an evil which is imposed on him by anyone else. Herein 
lies the difference between torture in the case of self-defence and other types of torture. 
As we will see, it plays no role that the pain is caused by the torturous acts in-
flicted directly by the policeman. This will not hinder us to consider the terrorist respon-
sible for his own pain. An indirect perpetrator is also responsible for an act as a perpe-
trator, although the act is directly "committed" by the "tool". The aim is to show that 
the terrorist can be considered as if he indirectly tortures himself and thus is responsible 
for the torture, which is done to him. At the first glance this sounds strange, but we will 
see that it is not. 
To answer the question whether the terrorist themselves is responsible for the act 
of torture and the pain and whether the pain caused by the act of torture can be consid-
221 Merkel, above n 4 I, 392. 
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ered as self-inflicted, one has to think about to whom the consequences of the act of 
self-defence (here it would be the consequences of the act of torture) are attributed.222 
According to the principles of criminal law the acts and the consequences of acts 
of self-defence, which are necessary to stop an attack, are the attacker's responsibility. 
Normally, no law student thinks about this question or fact, because often it is irrele-
vant. The consequences of acts in self-defence concern the attacker and the effects on 
him (e.g. the attacker is hurt or killed by the act of self-defence). So the question does 
not arise, whether the attacker is criminally liable for the consequences of the acts in 
self-defence by fulfilling elements of an offence (besides the committed elements of an 
offence, which he has fulfilled by his attack). 223 The reason is that self-inflicted injuries 
are not punishable. 
The case of arranged self-defence, where three persons are involved, shows that 
the consequences of acts in self-defence are the attacker's responsibility: The complete 
overstrained father (F) wants to get rid of his mentally ill224 son (S). As he knows that S 
is very irascible, he tells him, that the neighbour (N) (he knows that N is well-appointed 
with weapons) mistreated his sister very cruelly. "Such persons should be stabbed." The 
mentally-ill , but strong S runs, armed with a knife to the neighbour and jumps at the 
neighbour to kill him. N was only capable of rescuing himself by shooting S dead. 
F is guilty of an unlawful killing of his son S. Although F did not conduct the 
deadly act by himself, he is the perpetrator of a homicide - namely he killed his son as 
an indirect perpetrator because the deadly act of self-defence of N will be attributed to 
F. Simply because the father engineered the state of self-defence and he controlled the 
situation, as he set his mentally-ill (and therefore irresponsible) son on the neighbour 
and enabled N to kill his son (S) in a completely justified legal manner. Needless to say 
the act of self-defence (the killing of S) is also attributed to N, but as a justified act. 
Only Fis guilty and responsible for S' s death. 225 
These structures of attribution apply also in a case of self-defence, where only 
two persons are involved. That is to say, in a deadly self-defence the attacker intrinsi-
222 Ibid, 390. 
223 See also ibid, 390, 391 . 
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legal perspective, is responsible for the act of torture and for the torments. This could 
speak against an exception to the torture prohibition. 
• Is the hindrance of self-defence an objective participation in unjustness? 
One can take a step further and claim that a prohibition of torture in the case of self-
defence, also for the price of letting unlawful killings happen, means "de facto" a (at 
least "objective") governmental aid in unjustness."229 
The term "objective" means here that the actus reus of the aiding is fulfilled. 
Because it will be in all likelihood that the government lacks mens rea we speak only 
about an "objective" aid in unjustness. In Germany, where this approach has its origin, 
the mens rea is described with the term "subjective" elements of the offence, whereas 
the actus reus is described with "objective" elements of the offence. It is important to 
know that the criteria of attribution have nothing to do with the possibility to prosecute 
someone or to convict someone. Thus, the fact that a state cannot be prosecuted because 
only human beings can be prosecuted is irrelevant. Further more, for attribution the 
mens rea is not necessary. As said, the criteria of attribution are only used to determine 
the sphere of responsibility where the act can be attributed to. It is necessary to decide 
between an attribution on an objective level, where only the act is considered, and an 
attribution on the subjective level. Only for the latter would the mens rea be necessary. 
Because we differentiate between attribution on an objective and on a subjective level, 
we also differentiate between objective and subjective unjustness. Indeed, to penalise 
someone, objective and subjective unjustness is necessary. However, to determine 
someone's responsibility as the origin of a later result, objective unjustness is sufficient. 
For example, if a car driver runs over a person on the street and he did not know that 
there was someone on the street, the death will be attributed to him because by driving 
the car he created a risk (a risk that someone could be run over) and this risk became 
reality in the person's death. Though he will not be convicted because of the lack of 
mens rea does not make any difference to the fact that the car driver is objectively re-
sponsible for the death. 
When the state (objectively) aids the unjustness of unlawful killings by the com-
pliance of the international torture prohibition the question arises, whether it is legiti-
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cally kills himself by the necessary act of self-defence. He commits only the objective 
criteria of a suicide as a kind of "indirect perpetration"226 To argue against the indirect 
perpetration, one could say that an indirect perpetration applies only to statutory forbid-
den acts and suicide is not a statutory forbidden act. A second argument against, could 
be that the attacker has no intention to kill himself. However, all this is irrelevant to the 
question of attribution. For the attribution of criminal acts it is not necessary to fulfil the 
complete elements of an offence. 227 It is sufficient to fulfil only the actus reus without 
the mens rea. The question of attribution deals only with the question about the sphere 
of responsibility. By law the consequences of the deadly act are attributed to the at-
tacker, and in this case the punishability is inapplicable, because you are allowed to kill 
yourself. In the case of the overstrained father it was not allowed to kill the son. How-
ever, it cannot make a difference as to the sphere of responsibility, but only to the ques-
tion of punishability. 
Thus, one arrives at the conclusion as follows: The indirect perpetrator (who is 
the attacker) is seen to have killed the person who was used as a "tool" through the at-
tacked person (N), who acted in self-defence. Similarly in a two-person-scenario the 
direct perpetrator is seen to kill himself in a kind of indirect perpetration because the 
attacked person acts in self-defence. This reasoning is applied to the torture-case. The 
tortured person could be seen to torture himself. 228 
Thus, why should torture be prohibited, when the kidnapper inflicts the torture 
on himself? There is also no violation of human dignity inflicted by the state because it 
was considered as self inflicted. Therefore the terrorist is responsible for the violation of 
his own human dignity. He had it in his hand to stop this violation. Even more, he is 
legally obligated to stop it because he is obligated to give information about the hidden 
bomb. Thus, concerns as to a violation of human dignity are, from a legal perspective, 
causeless. This calls for an exception to the torture prohibition. 
However, a normal citizen will not understand the criteria attribution and it 
seems to them as if the state considers torture as a good thing and thus the infliction of 
human dignity as legal and right. Citizens will only recognize the torments of the terror-
ist which are caused by the hand of the policeman, but they will not know who, from a 
226 Ibid. 
227 See also ibid. 
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mate that the state complies with the prohibition of torture. This could speak then for an 
exception to the torture prohibition. 
Whether the state really (objectively) aids unlawful killings when it complies 
with the international torture prohibition and because of its compliance forbids the only 
helpful act, which is torture, can only be answered by considering the following ques-
tion: "What do we attribute to anyone, who uses coercion to avert a for life-saving nec-
essary act of self-defence by a third party? To find out the answer one has to put the 
absolute prohibition of torture on a level with the interruption of a rescuing causality. 
For this purpose we use the case as follows: 230 
A attacks B with a knife to kill him. X, who physically outclasses A, wants to 
put himself between both, to rescue B. When Y averts the rescue effort of X by aiming 
at X with a pistol and thereby threatens him to stop the rescue of B, then Y is a partici-
pant of the homicide of A. Here we assume that Y knows that A wanted to kill B and 
that Y wanted to stop X to make sure that A can kill B. 
Henceforth one has to consider applying this structure of attribution to the cases 
of self-defence, where the only helpful act to rescue somebody is to torture the attacker 
(terrorist). One can bar the potential life-saver not only by threatening him with a pistol 
from rescuing an attacked person, but also with an imposition of a punishable torture 
prohibition. 23 1 When the state prohibits torture, then the state (in our case) makes it pos-
sible for the terrorist to withhold the life saving information that will kill hundreds of 
people. If the state had allowed the police to torture the terrorist, then the death of hun-
dreds of people would have been averted by the police. Thus, the state could be seen to 
be objectively responsible of aiding in killing hundreds of people by following the in-
ternational torture prohibition and by preventing the police from saving the people. 232 
That the state has not the mens rea to kill the people is obvious, but it is not necessary to 
have mens rea for the attribution. 
However, one could assert that it is forbidden for the state to torture somebody 
by international treaties andjus cogens, so the state behaves right by law, when they do 
229 Ibid, 393 ; see Erb, above n 41 , 27. 
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not torture the attacker (= terrorist). Thus one cannot say that the state is a "participant" 
in an unlawful killing, because they behaved in a law-abiding way. However, according 
to all applicable concepts of states since the modem legal philosophy of Hobbes, it is 
the duty of a state to protect the right to life of its citizens. It is even the primary condi-
tion to legitimate the existence of a state as a system with authority. In this case the state 
omits not only to fulfil his obligations; but allies itself with the unjustness of an unlaw-
ful killing of human beings. 
When the state objectively aids an unjust and unlawful killing by complying 
with the prohibition of torture, this compliance is illegitimate. This calls again for an 
exception to the torture prohibition. 
(d) Intermediate result 
Although it turned out that an exception to the torture prohibition from a legal perspec-
tive is tenable, the same reasons233 which speak against the necessity defence could con-
sult here in a second step. Thus, a cost-benefit analysis goes against a state authorized 
torture. An exception to the torture prohibition in the case of self-defence in a "ticking 
bomb scenario" is therefore not recommended. 
B Use of Torture for Preventative Reasons 
The use of torture for preventative reasons, such as to obtain information about future 
terrorist attacks, cannot be based on the three abovementioned approaches. All three 
approaches demand imminent danger, and in cases, where torture is used for preventive 
reasons, the danger is not imminent. One could use other methods to find out informa-
tion about future terrorist attacks, such as by normal investigations. 234 
C Intermediate Result 
An exception to the prohibition of torture in international law could not be recom-
mended for the future. Whereas the use of torture for preventative reasons has to be re-
jected from the outset as none of the three approaches applies because of the lack of 
233 See above, V A2b, 38 f .. 
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imminent danger, torture to hold off imminent danger would be tenable from a legal 
perspective, but has to be rejected as well because of the same concerns applied to the 
necessary defence, particularly slippery slope-effects. 
However, it is in all likelihood that most people would use torture as a last resort 
in a "ticking bomb scenario". Who wants to die? Or can we expect that people acqui-
esce their death? Probably not. However, judges could make allowances for these facts 
in the degree of penalty. An allowance for the torturer's motive is preferable to excep-
tions to the torture prohibition from the outset. If torture is allowed from the outset, then 
the use of torture will get out of the hand. Moreover, the awareness of injustice gets lost 
as soon as the state breaks the taboo and legitimates torture under special circumstances. 
Therefore it is recommended to impose not too high a sanction on a policeman 
who found himself in a "ticking bomb scenario" and who decided to use torture to save 
hundreds of lives. Maybe the court could also do without a penalty. However, precau-
tion is recommended. A rash abdication of a penalty could lead to the impression that 
the state endorses the use of torture. The state has to make it clear that someone, who 
uses torture, has to face a court proceeding and a penalty. Only a court proceeding can 
clarify whether there was a dilemma situation and that the use of torture was indeed not 
justified but the matter can be closed with a mild penalty. This shows the society that 
torture is and remains prohibited. Thus, a policeman would think twice about using tor-
ture or not. 
VI CONCLUSION 
In the "war on terror", "national security interests may constitute a legitimate reason for 
sacrificing others interests, except for one uncompromising interest: the human right 
against torture"235 • It turns out that the prohibition of torture in international law is a 
norm, which claims absoluteness, and from which no derogation is permissible under 
existing law. Also in times of the "war on terror" this should remain unchanged and for 
good reason: The attitude towards torture separates democracies from dictatorship and 
constitutional states from regimes of unjustness. 236 
To make sure that any future attempt to circumvent the torture prohibition is 
impossible, it is time that the European Court of Human Rights provides clear criteria to 
234 See Cohan, above n I 99, I 616. 
235 Lim, above n 5, 84. 
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distinguish torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Fur-
thermore one has to counter resolutely the requests for exceptions to the torture prohibi-
tion in particular situation. None of the discussed approaches was convincing in the end 
to allow torture even in exceptional cases. If torture is allowed in exceptional cases and 
thus institutionalized, it will "become the norm rather than the exception"237 and this 
would threaten the constitutional state as a whole. 
236 Bruha and Steiger, above n 97, 49. 
237 Cohan, above n 199, 1614. 
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